Best Ghana News Websites: Review of Ghana News Media Space

The government does not force content providers to block or filter online content that would be considered protected speech under international human rights law.

In May 2016, police officials suggested that the government may restrict access to social media platforms to “maintain peace” during the December 2016 elections. After public outcry, then-president Mahama announced authorities would not do so. See footnote 29 

That same month, the NCA announced that it had received a petition from telecommunications companies to ban OTT services like Skype, WhatsApp, and Viber.30 The government denied that it would block those services after the announcement was heavily criticized. See footnote 31

Government officials rarely force content hosts or online outlets to delete content. The last known instance of a forced takedown was in June 2019. Content hosts are not liable for their users' activity under Ghanian law.

In February 2021, solicitors for the Judicial Service issued a letter to media houses, requesting that certain platforms remove content deemed offensive to Supreme Court judges. The letter noted that the solicitors would “take appropriate action” if the media houses did not comply. See footnote 32 The directive was resisted by the Media Foundation for West Africa (MFWA) and the Ghana Journalists Association. See footnote 33 

In March 2021, Chief Justice Kwasi Anin-Yeboah later made conciliatory statements regarding the issue, acknowledging the media's right to criticize the judiciary. See footnote 34 

The are no known cases where outlets removed content in response to the letter.

In June 2019, National Security Minister Albert Kan-Dapaah ordered the online news outlet Modern Ghana to take down an article it had published that month. The article reportedly criticized Kan-Dapaah and a member of Parliament. Modern Ghana complied with the request. A day later, security forces arrested two Modern Ghana employees and detained them, torturing one. See footnote 35

Facebook, Google, and Twitter reported no requests for content removal from the Ghanaian government during the period of June to December 2020. See footnote 36

The Electronic Transactions Act (ETA), 2008 safeguards service providers from liability for illegal user content, as long as the service provider does not know that the content is illegal and removes it once notified. See footnote 37

Online content restrictions are rare in Ghana, though legal processes for blocking and content removal do not establish clear rules for transparency and appeals. The last known case in which online content was removed at the request of a government official, in June 2019, was politicized, lacked transparency, and was disproportionate.

The ETA requires service providers to remove illegal content once notified. The act does not include provisions on user notice or avenues of appeal. Intermediaries can be held liable for “wrongful” removals of content. See footnote 38 

The Cybersecurity Act, 2020 provides broad authority for the Cybersecurity Authority (CA) to block or filter online content on receipt of a court order. The law also places penalties on service providers that fail to comply with a blocking or filtering order, which may include up to one to five years' imprisonment. See footnote 39 

Section 99 of the ECA, which gives the president broad powers over service providers during a state of emergency, may also provide legal authority for blocking and filtering. See footnote 40

Ghanian internet users generally express themselves freely online, though some people engage in self-censorship when discussing certain sensitive issues. Media professionals report a growing sense of intimidation and a growing culture of intolerance for dissenting views on social media.

Some Ghanian internet users may avoid expressing opinions online for fear of being attacked by trolls or supporters of powerful political figures, as has been widely reported. See footnote 41 

Users avoid discussion of subjects that are likely to lead to retribution in the form of public outrage, as online harassment is increasingly common, particularly for women.

Abuses against journalists by security forces, political partisans, and the general public have driven some reporters to be wary of their digital footprints. See footnote 42 

Some journalists prefer to remain anonymous on social media to prevent offline confrontations. In some cases, Ghanaian journalists are not able to publicly express themselves because of politicized conditions set by the owners of their media outlet. See footnote 43

Online media outlets, and the Ghanaian media industry more generally, are manipulated by political parties and government officials through bribery, informal arrangements, and paid social media commentators.

Journalists are often offered money for “transportation” for attending an event and providing coverage, under a practice known as “soli.” As a practice, soli undermines objectivity and influences news coverage. In some cases, the soli offered is sufficiently large to influence how a journalist covers their story, or in some cases, serves to discourage publishing a story. See footnote 44

A number of online journalists, bloggers, and website owners have indicated that government officials or other actors attempt to bribe them or use close economic ties with service providers to influence the content they produce. See footnote 45 

Political parties also seek to shape public perception by recruiting senior journalists to produce favourable coverage through their networks. See footnote 46 

Public officials, including the president, are commonly understood to have close relationships with certain journalists who provide favourable coverage.

Government officials, political parties, and other actors surreptitiously employ individuals or automated systems to artificially amplify political narratives or smear campaigns on social media. Political parties regularly recruit social media commentators to drive conversations online, particularly following the 2016 elections. The ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP) reportedly pays over 700 social media commentators as of 2019. See footnote 47

Ahead of the December 2020 elections, several websites were created that impersonated trusted news sites and fact-checkers. The mock websites, which included clones of the state-owned newspaper Daily Graphic and the MFWA's fact-checking website,48 reportedly posted the content that exclusively targeted the NPP, raising suspicions about the opposition National Democratic Congress's (NDC) involvement. See footnote 49

There are no formal constraints that limit the viability of online media outlets or service providers. The media landscape generally favours print and television media, including state media, which collect the bulk of advertising revenues in Ghana. See footnote 50 

Online media outlets tend to rely on the monetization of their websites rather than advertising revenue.

Generally, people are able to access a range of local, regional and international news sources that convey independent and balanced views in many languages. While Akan- and English-language media tend to dominate in print and online, regional and community radios offer expansive linguistic diversity. See footnote 51

Ghanaians using social media platforms are faced with misinformation on a daily basis. Political-party affiliates and troll armies sometimes fabricate stories to dilute topical discussions (see B5); according to AfroBarometer, 78 per cent of Ghanaians identified politicians as a source of misinformation. See footnote 52

Only 39 per cent of Ghanaians trust social media as a source of information, compared to the 55 per cent who trust public and private media outlets. This mistrust has driven support for social media regulation in the country. See footnote 53

Civil society organizations, such as Penplusbytes and the MFWA, work to counter misinformation. Since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the MFWA has worked to counter COVID-19 misinformation, recruiting fact-checkers and updating COVID-19 data on Ghana and Africa. See footnote 54 

Both organizations were active in fighting misinformation during the December 2020 elections, engaging in fact-checking efforts and forging partnerships with media outlets and government agencies. See footnote 55

Conditions in Ghana are suitable for people to mobilize and campaign on political and social issues in Ghana. People are generally able to mobilize without any state interference.

On May 2, 2021, Ghanaians started the Twitter hashtags #FixTheCountry and #FixTheCountryNow to protest an increase in fuel prices and taxes, as well as the poor healthcare system, bad road networks, and high rental rates. See footnote 56 

Government officials and social media accounts linked to the government responded by circulating hashtags like #FixYourself, #NanaIsFixingIt, and #NanaIsWorking to compete with #FixTheCountry.

On May 4, the National Petroleum Authority and Ministry of Energy adjusted a planned fuel-price increase downward, to take effect the following day. See footnote 57 

On May 9, Ghanaians protested in person and online after a court issued an injunction blocking a planned #FixTheCountry demonstration, citing COVID-19 restrictions. See footnote 58 

Ghanaians have since continued to mobilize online and offline under the #FixTheCountry banner, including through a large protest held in August 2021, after the coverage period. See footnote 59

In November 2018, a group of civil society organizations, including the MFWA and the Media Coalition on Right to Information (RTI), launched the #RTIRedFriday campaign to pressure the government into passing the RTI Bill. See footnote 60 

This campaign represented a significant contribution to the advocacy campaign that ended with the RTI Bill's March 2019 passage.

Also in late 2018, residents of Madina, in the Greater Accra Region, launched the #FixOurFootbridgesNOW social media campaign after drivers killed more than 24 pedestrians crossing major roads. Youth leaders used Facebook and other social media platforms to mobilize demonstrations calling for the completion of footbridges in the locality. As of June 2019, during the previous coverage period, the government completed the footbridges. See footnote 61

Political parties had to adjust their campaigning methods ahead of the December 2020 elections due to COVID-19-related restrictions. Both the NPP and the NDC mobilized supporters over social media. See footnote 62 

Both political parties also employed social media communication officers who mostly engaged in propaganda.