The Stool Belongs to All

The stool belongs to all. Its voice cannot belong to one party (Constitution, art. 276(1)).

The Constitution guarantees freedom of speech and expression, including freedom of the press and other media (art. 21(1)(a)). Like other fundamental rights, that freedom is exercised subject to respect for the rights and freedoms of others and the public interest (art. 12(2)).

The Constitution also imposes more specific restraints arising from particular offices, including the prohibition against chiefs taking part in active party politics (art. 276(1)).

Why does the Constitution limit what a person can say based on the office that person occupies? And do different offices require restraint for different reasons?

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In Gorni v. Attorney-General (J1/08/2020) the Supreme Court considered the constitutional prohibition against chiefs taking part in “active party politics” and drew an important line.

A chief may praise or criticize a policy, programme or project associated with a candidate or political party. Chiefs are champions and advocates for the development and welfare of their communities. They must therefore remain free to discuss roads, schools, hospitals, jobs and other matters affecting their people.

But a chief crosses the constitutional line by endorsing a candidate or political party, declaring an electoral preference, campaigning for a candidate, or urging the people to vote for that candidate.

Why? Because the stool or skin belongs to all the people—NPP, NDC, CPP, Independents, and everyone in between.

A chief is expected to be a symbol and instrument of community unity. Taking sides in an inherently divisive partisan contest may divide the community, weaken confidence in the chief’s impartial leadership, diminish the dignity of the stool or skin, and expose chieftaincy to political exploitation.

The Constitution therefore creates a form of mutual restraint: politicians must not capture or manipulate chieftaincy, and chiefs must not convert the authority of chieftaincy into political support for parties and candidates.

The danger is not merely theoretical. In their published study of Ghana’s 2020 election, Sarah Brierley and George Kwaku Ofosu found that exposure to a chief’s endorsement increased support for the endorsed candidate. The effect was concentrated among politically unaligned voters, who were also more likely subsequently to report voting for that candidate (Comparative Political Studies 2024).

The chief did not need to offer a persuasive explanation. The endorsement itself mattered because voters treated the chief’s position as a signal of the candidate’s quality.

Thus, when a chief speaks, it is not only the individual who speaks. The prestige and authority of the stool or skin speak with him. That institutional authority must not be converted into electoral influence for a candidate or party.

The Court’s holding concerned chiefs. It nevertheless made an important observation:

“Holders of independent constitutional or statutory offices, notably judges, members of the Electoral Commission, the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice, and the National Commission on Civic Education, are, by implication from their independent status, similarly constrained in their freedom or ability to actively take sides in partisan politics.”

That observation is significant, but the Court did not define the precise boundaries of permissible speech for those independent officeholders.

Nor can the line drawn for chiefs simply be transferred to them. The reasons for restraint are different.

For chiefs, the central concerns are community unity, impartial traditional leadership, the dignity of the stool or skin, and the protection of chieftaincy from political capture.

For judges, electoral commissioners and other independent public officers, the central concerns are institutional neutrality and public confidence in the impartial exercise of constitutional power.

That difference may require an even stricter approach to the political speech of independent officers.

The Court allowed chiefs to praise or criticize policies and programmes because advocating for community development is part of the chiefly role.

But an independent public officer ordinarily has no mandate to promote the programme of a candidate or political party.

Consider the Chairperson of the Electoral Commission. She may properly promote the Commission’s institutional programmes—voter registration, voter education, electoral accessibility, electoral reform and credible election administration.

But can she enthusiastically endorse a government programme closely associated with a candidate or party and then insist that she has not endorsed the candidate?

GOGO thinks not.

The electoral referee who praises one team’s strategy may not have expressly declared support for that team. But the praise may still raise reasonable doubts about the referee’s neutrality.

Every disputed decision may thereafter be viewed through a partisan lens. Every administrative error may be suspected of being deliberate. Every declared result may become more difficult for the losing side to accept.

The harm does not depend on proof that the election was manipulated. The statement itself may weaken confidence in the impartiality of the institution.

The principle applies with equal force to other independent public officers.

A judge who praises the signature programme of a political party may create reasonable doubts when disputes involving that party later come before the court.

A CHRAJ commissioner who promotes a partisan government initiative may weaken confidence in the Commission’s willingness to investigate the government impartially.

An NCCE commissioner who celebrates one party’s programme may compromise the Commission’s ability to provide civic education that every citizen can trust.

An Auditor-General, Special Prosecutor or other independent officer who publicly applauds or attacks partisan programmes may cause official decisions to be interpreted as extensions of a political preference.

The issue is not whether these officers cease to be citizens. They retain their thoughts, beliefs and private political preferences.

The issue is whether they may use the voice and prestige of an independent office to express views that reasonably identify the institution with one side of the political contest.

Actual impartiality is not enough. Independent institutions also depend on the reasonable appearance of impartiality.

Political neutrality does not require silence on every matter of public importance. Independent officers must explain their work, defend their mandates and speak candidly about threats to the institutions they lead.

But there is a difference between defending constitutional principles and praising partisan programmes.

There is a difference between explaining public policy and promoting the political actors responsible for it.

There is a difference between speaking for an institution and using an institution to amplify a personal political preference.

Thus, the question is not merely:

“Do I have a right to say it?”

The more demanding questions are:

“Does the office permit me to say it?”

“Is it consistent with my institutional mandate?”

“Could a reasonable citizen interpret it as taking sides?”

“Will it preserve or weaken confidence in the institution?”

For chiefs, the Supreme Court has drawn the line: they may discuss policies and programmes, but they may not endorse candidates or parties.

For independent public officers, the precise boundaries await fuller judicial definition. But the logic of independence suggests that they should refrain not only from formally endorsing candidates, but also from praising or condemning partisan programmes in ways that reasonably reveal political preference.

Political speech is not restricted merely because an office is important. It is restricted when such speech threatens the constitutional purpose for which the office must remain above the political contest.

For chiefs, that purpose is principally unity. For independent public officers, it is principally neutrality.

Freedom gives citizens a voice. Public office gives that voice unusual power.

And constitutional wisdom requires those who accept offices of trust to understand that not every personal opinion is theirs to express publicly.

There is a time to speak. There is a time to remain silent. And there is a time to remember that the office must always be larger than its occupant.